Showing posts with label problem. Show all posts
Showing posts with label problem. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

The Future of Journalism Is Not in the Past

Reframing the Debate Over how to "Save" Journalism

The question of "How to save Journalism?" is a front-burner issue, as major metropolitan dailies, like the Rocky Mountain News and the Philadelphia Inquirer, implode. Calls for bailouts in the tens of billions of dollars have gone up, even from critics of the industry, and some are calling for further relaxation of limits on media ownership so newspapers and television stations can merge, presumably to improve the financial prospects of both.
After excoriating the commercial mass media for decades, should we spend huge sums of public money to prop it up or abandon our concern about large mass media outlets and chains dominating local markets?
We need to step back and ask some tough questions. What do we mean by "good" journalism and why should we "save" it? What is the problem with the newspaper business? Will saving newspapers save journalism? Will allowing mergers solve the economic problem or improve the quality of content? What alternatives are available?

Why Does Journalism Need to Be Saved?

The premise of the effort to save newspapers is that journalism provides a public function that needs to be preserved. "Good" journalism is a public good because it creates value far beyond the revenue stream it generates. The benefit to society is supposed to be its function as a watchdog on both the public and private sectors -- disciplining waste, fraud and abuse -- and as a source of information for the public about important issues of public policy. Because it is a public good, commercial markets tend to under-produce it, so it needs non-market support. In the United States the mass media has long been subsidized, starting with low postal rates to support print media in the 19th century and running through free exclusive licenses to use the public airwaves to broadcast radio and TV in the 20th century.

What Is the Underlying Problem?

To deal with the crisis of journalism, we have to recognize key characteristics of the future journalism space. The majority of newspaper revenues come from local advertising. Newspaper advertising revenues are driven by readership, which has been declining. However, advertising revenues have been declining more rapidly than readership; classified advertising has been declining more rapidly than general advertising; and local newspaper advertising has been declining more rapidly than national activity. Thus, there is a migration of revenue to other media -- the Internet, local cable TV and direct mail -- that deliver more targeted or more compelling advertising. In 2000, the revenues of these three advertising media were just 12 percent larger than newspaper advertising; by 2007 they were 82 percent larger.
The future is digital: text, not print; viral, not one-to-many; and, in critical ways, more global and less local. For newspapers that means that geography does not matter as much as it once did. Functional specialization replaces geographic specialization.
Much of the journalism we lament losing is statewide, regional, national and international. If an issue is not inherently local, such as a school board election, it will have difficulty commanding resources in the local media because "outsiders" can now use digital distribution to aggregate a larger audience. Local papers will simply not be able to compete in reporting on global, national or statewide issues and they have begun to outsource that function.
Newspapers in medium to large cities that historically covered local, statewide, regional, national and some global news are in the worst shape because the new environment impacts their business model most. In the digital age, they cannot maintain adequate advertising revenue -- losing ground to cable and web-based alternatives to classified ads -- to sustain adequate investment in such broad-based reporting. They lose competitively in the national and global markets to the big national newspapers and wire services.
Small town papers may fare better because they face less competition in small local markets, but those local markets will not support the journalism that covers statewide, regional, and global issues. Large national and international papers and services may fare better, since they can aggregate demand. It is the hole in the middle where the impact is greatest.

Would the Proposals to "Save" Journalism by Saving Newspapers Work?

The assumption that subsidies or mergers will save journalism economically in the face of the powerful underlying economic forces or ensure the delivery of journalism's public good is dubious at best.
The commercial mass media newspaper model was failing to properly fulfill its public function long before its economic model collapsed. Any subsidy might push the economic day of reckoning off, but it will not solve the long-term economic problem. The most successful commercial papers are not necessarily the best. We could get more of the same journalism we have had, maybe even lower quality, as newspapers compete for more scarce advertising dollars.
Concentrating large media voices to shore up commercial media has not been an economic panacea. The large multimedia chains and cross-owned properties are having just as much trouble as stand-alone entities, and mergers have tended to reduce the quality of journalism in the past. The efficiencies that merging parties project will be gained by shrinking the production of news. The amount of news produced declines, but the number of journalists declines even more, squeezing the remaining journalists. If advertising dollars continue to shrink and attention continues to migrate to other media, cutting costs will not replace lost revenue and the burden will be born by shrinking the worst performing line of business, which is likely to be print journalism. One thing is certain, with shrinking markets and overstretched reporters, the quality of journalism (i.e. good reporting), and the types of journalism that best represent the public goods -- investigative journalism -- will decline. Thus, mergers between newspapers and TV are not a solution for the crisis of newspapers or the problems of journalism.
The dilemma from the public good's point of view is the fact that the political importance of the commercial mass media has always exceeded their economic significance and economic resources are shifting more rapidly than political influence. Newspaper and television are still the mass market media and carry substantial political clout. The hundreds of millions of dollars spent on national advertising during the recent presidential election and the role that newspaper endorsements play, especially in early primaries, are reminders of the clout of the commercial mass media. The counterbalance to the commercial mass media has not fully developed, either economically, to sustain "good" journalism," or politically, to blunt the power of traditional commercial outlets.
At this key moment, we should not prop up the incumbent media, or give in to its demands to concentrate, which will extend a model that is irretrievably broken, economically and politically. We should focus public policy and citizen action on building the alternatives.

Are New Models Emerging for a Changed Information Environment?

The commercial newspaper market in the 21st century media environment leaves substantial gaps in coverage that need to be filled. The digital age has witnessed an explosion of alternative media and citizen expression that did not exist in the age of 20th century mass media.
The cacophony of the blogosphere is dizzying and overwhelmingly opinion, but it is a vast improvement over a public sphere dominated by corporate media. Traditional media have begun to utilize this communications mechanism, with reporters blogging and bloggers reporting on traditional media web sites, but it is the independent, citizen and community media that provide the seeds of an alternative journalism.
These alternatives tend to be structured viral communications, in which a light touch of hierarchy can go a long way. The examples are well known, beyond blogging, which tends to be the least organized form of expression. We find things like Wikis, online posts, collaborative production and distribution in peer-to-peer networks, opens source software, crowd sourcing, and new forms of copyright, like the Creative Commons, etc.
The critical challenge for these outlets is to become trusted intermediaries. The critical challenge for society is to figure out how to tap into the immense energy of the public sphere in cyberspace while preserving key journalistic attributes someplace within a much-expanded public sphere. To build trust the new journalism will have to produce a steady stream of output that readers find authoritative, correct and useful. To ensure the quality of output, they will need to routinize the roles of reporter and editor and find ways to ensure that the reporters and editors have resources to do their jobs. If we equate good journalism with careful reporting, editing and opportunity for response, how do we map those basic characteristics of journalism into the new media space?
We can debate whether those attributes are the key to "good" journalism, but even if we take that as a given, it is the journalistic functions that matter, not the form. We must be willing to recognize other ways of performing traditional functions. How can contributed and paid labor, professional and citizen mix? How much editorial control could be applied without destroying the wiki essence? What models of editorial oversight best balance the goal of quality content and democratic input (lieutenants, councils, member rankings, member voting)? What decision-making management structures and group processes can promote progress toward completion of tasks, determine critical tasks and screen acceptable solutions, not unlike the functions of editorial boards and editors.
Some parts of the 20th century landscape can be mobilized in support of the new journalism. Consumer Reports, a well-known nonprofit journalistic enterprise, fearing a declining revenue stream from print publishing, has transformed itself into a hugely successful mass online subscription business. It has a trusted brand to build on, but there is no reason that other nonprofit brands cannot be built in cyberspace to support subscription models. Among the existing one-to-many media distribution models, those that are closest to the emerging citizen-media, like public governmental and educational cable channels on the TV side and low power FM on the radio side, have never been properly funded, but they have grown on the basis of a direct connection to the local community.
In other words, the participatory base of citizen and community media, a tradition that existed in America before the industrialization of the media and journalism in the past century, is a superior starting point for building a new journalism.

Can Public Subsidies Speed the Transition to a Good Journalism Model?

Just as federal Recovery Act stimulus funds will support computer centers and communications networks, a media stimulus package could support new local news centers and news services. Just as IT health and education funds seek to build a new infrastructure for public service in their areas, IT media funding can build infrastructure in the journalism space. Public subsidies can be directed to alternative forms of media and journalism with the objective of establishing financially viable new forms of production and distribution of journalistic content.
No one can predict which models will succeed, but in the rapidly changing environment, solutions that preserve the past are more likely to fail or make matters worse. The outcome will be much better if we confront the right and hard questions from the get-go in order to arrive at a sustainable journalism that serves its function in society. If we intend to build an institution of journalism as the four estate in the 21st century, we need to build it from the fresh clay of alternative media in cyberspace and the moment of the collapse of 20th century journalism is the ideal time to start.

Source: huffingtonpost.com

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Washington Post Newspaper Facing Losses, Chairman Says

THE Washington Post newspaper will follow a money-losing 2008 by losing "substantial money" in 2009 and will continue to cut costs, Post Co. Chairman Donald E. Graham said in a letter to shareholders included in the company's annual report released yesterday.
The Post Co. newspaper division -- which is dominated by the flagship paper but also includes the Everett (Wash.) Herald, Express and a number of smaller papers -- reported a $24.9 million operating loss last year.
As a whole, The Post Co. -- which also owns the Kaplan education company, Cable One cable company, six television stations, Newsweek, Slate and a number of other publications -- saw its 2008 revenue rise compared with 2007, though earnings dropped, because of charges related to the falling value of assets and one-time charges.
"The familiar problems of the newspaper industry -- declining readership and the loss of classified -- are now made worse by bankrupt advertisers," Graham writes. "The newspaper will lose substantial money in 2009. Some will be non-cash accelerated depreciation because we will be closing a printing plant. Most will be real losses."
Newsweek "has a plan it hopes will change the direction of the business and put the magazine on a better and more profitable course," Graham writes.
Graham said The Post Co. is willing to lose money on The Post and Newsweek "as we did at Kaplan from 1994 to 2001" if the two publications show that they have a plan to achieve profitability.
Graham writes that "The Post will get every chance" to become profitable again.
"It sounds as though there's a commitment to the paper, which obviously doesn't surprise me," newspaper analyst John Morton said. "Clearly, the principal owners are committed to staying in the business even if it's not consistently profitable."
Nevertheless, Graham warns in the letter: "Post management knows that losses must diminish in 2010."
Despite the grim news, Graham is hopeful for the future of news as a business.
"Ten years from now, it is highly likely that customers will be getting news from profitable institutions staffed by talented reporters and editors," Graham writes. "We're going to try to show a way."
Kaplan and Cable One combined provide almost 70 percent of current Post Co. revenue. In 1998, Graham writes, The Post, Newsweek and the television stations provided 75 percent of company revenue.
The Post Co. said its pension was overfunded by $320 million at the end of 2008.
The company reported a pension credit of $25.7 million on its income statement for 2008, and projects that credit will fall to $6 million by the end of 2009, partly as the result of a 25 percent drop in pension fund investment returns in 2008.

Source: Thw Washington Post

Thursday, February 26, 2009

It's Not Newspapers in Peril; It's Their Owners

Dailies Still Make Good Money, but Debt-Laden Publishers Post Losses

FOR all the apocalyptic news about newspapers, there's a distinction worth making: Newspaper owners are far more endangered than the medium itself.
Even as they take blow after blow from recession and digital media, newspapers themselves still earn decent profits. They do even better outside big cities, which tend to get all the attention.
"Not a lot of papers are operating at a loss," said John Morton, the veteran industry analyst. "There are roughly 1,400 daily newspapers. We only hear about the top markets. That leaves at least 1,300 papers out there."
Publicly owned newspapers averaged an operating profit of 10.8% in the first three quarters of last year, Mr. Morton said. That's not the margin enjoyed by newspapers when they were monopolies, but it's not nothing either.

Problems at the top
The owners, on the other hand, are variously posting huge losses, at least on paper; watching their stock prices plunge; and, crucially, struggling to make payments on debt they took on under projections that didn't pan out.
Some owners even borrowed that money to double down on newspapers, which aren't engines of growth even when their balance sheets are healthy.
More newspaper owners will probably follow Tribune Co., where Sam Zell's rescue attempt has failed, into bankruptcy protection. Some papers will be handed to lenders. There will be fire sales.
But there's no reason for newspapers themselves, whoever owns them, to stop the presses. Most operations are plenty profitable.
And demand for their core product -- news -- is growing, as shown by the soaring traffic to newspaper websites. Those web surfers don't bring the same ad rates that print readers do. But the business of newspapering has a longer bridge to the future than it often seems.

Write-down
Take a look at Lee Enterprises, which operates papers primarily in midsize markets but reported an $889 million net loss for the 12 months ended Sept. 28. Its loss primarily reflected a huge accounting write-down as the company adjusted its estimated value. It's not that $889 million of cash flowed from the coffers just to make payroll and keep the presses running.
Strip out the accounting charge to look at the real dollars Lee papers collected and spent. Its operating profit for those 12 months topped 20%. That's a better return than Carlos Slim is getting on his 14% loan to The New York Times Co., which finally suspended its dividend payments last week to shore up cash flow.
Lee, moreover, bought itself more time late last week by reaching agreements with lenders to refinance $306 million of debt tied to its 2005 purchase of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The publisher of the Southern Illinoisan, a Lee paper, used the occasion to distinguish between Lee's finances and his paper's health, telling readers that the refinancing and related moves "quashes ill-considered speculation that Lee's debt obligations could somehow impair the ability of The Southern Illinoisan to continue serving readers and advertisers."
In a similar fashion, McClatchy is freezing pensions and hunting another $100 million in budget cuts. The company, publisher of papers including the Sacramento Bee and the Fort-Worth Star Telegram, is struggling under more than $2 billion in debt, much of which it assumed in 2006 to buy Knight Ridder -- doubling down on newspapers at a cost of $4.6 billion.
But look past the interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and charges such as severance; they matter, but they affect the owner's balance sheet more than they reflect newspapers' viability. McClatchy's underlying newspaper portfolio just delivered a 21.5% operating profit margin.

Gannett profits
The country's biggest newspaper publisher, Gannett, is rolling in layoffs and busily writing down its own estimated value. But excluding one-time charges such as severance and write-downs, its newspapers -- from big markets such as Phoenix to small towns such as Ithaca, N.Y. -- produced an 18% operating profit margin last year.
Scripps is trying to decide whether to sell or shut down the Rocky Mountain News in Denver, which lost $16 million in 2008. But its overall newspaper portfolio, perhaps better typified by the Naples Daily News in Florida, last week reported a 2008 operating profit margin of 9.8%.
Even the newspapers owned by Tribune, which entered Chapter 11 last December because it took on too much debt going private, returned a modest 5.4% operating profit in the first three quarters of last year.
The bigger markets, to be sure, are struggling more. "Smaller markets tend to have relatively high margins because you're more of a quasi-monopoly," said Alexia Quadrani, an analyst at J.P. Morgan. "The New York Times is going to have low margins because of its high expense base. The Boston Globe's margins have deteriorated meaningfully in recent years, just because of the ongoing weakness in that marketplace."

Worse year than last
And even if newspapers aren't the walking dead, they're obviously the walking wounded. Public newspaper companies were reporting operating profit margins averaging 21% as recently as 2006, according to Ken Doctor, a longtime newspaper executive turned industry analyst for Outsell. "At that point it had been dropping about a quarter percent, a third of a percent, each year for three years," he said. "It had been a slow drop in relatively good economic times. Now we know 2009 is going to be worse than 2008."
We don't know how much advertising will return to newspapers once the recession lifts, Mr. Morton pointed out. "In all previous recoveries from recession, newspapers were able to recapture almost everything they lost," he said. "It has since become much more competitive for eyeballs and advertisers. I'm sure it won't be 100%."
All that probably means today's newspaper owners won't all be in the business much longer. Many will exit one way or another, following the Chandlers, who once controlled Times Mirror, and the Bancrofts, who once owned Dow Jones.

Source: AdAge.com

Thursday, December 11, 2008

The Fundamental Problem of Newspapers on the Internet

I introduce you to the fundamental problem of newspapers on the internet: The Krugman Paradox - named by me after watching PetMeds.com (PETS) ads appear next to Paul Krugman for three days after it was announced he won a Nobel Prize.
I couldn't believe there wasn't a better way to monetize his presence on NYTimes.com (NYT). Further investigation revealed that the Krugman problem was not unique.

Here goes.

Definition:
The Krugman Paradox is a phenomenon referring to newspapers' websites and the sites' inability to produce economically sustainable advertising revenue, despite their highest audience reach in the history of their industry. The paradox indicates that newspapers must increase the effectiveness of their online advertising if this is to be their main revenue stream.

Prior Art:
On April 7, 2008, Nicholas Carr put forth a theory he referred to as "unbundling". Boiled down to its core, the theory states that advertisements (bundled with content) in a printed newspaper produce a product worth more than the sum of their parts. The opposite is true online where ad performance must stand alone on a single web page. As he writes,
As soon as a newspaper is unbundled, an intricate and, until now, largely invisible system of subsidization quickly unravels. Classified ads, for instance, can no longer help to underwrite the salaries of investigative journalists or overseas correspondents. Each piece of content has to compete separately, consuming costs and generating revenues in isolation.
On September 10, 2007, Doc Searls wrote about the utility of traditional advertising and how better ways of connecting customers to products and services have been created on the internet. He cautions newspapers who assume advertising will always be around at the levels prior to the existence of the internet. As he writes,
While rivers of advertising money flow away from old media and toward new ones, both the old and the new media crowds continue to assume that advertising money will flow forever. This is a mistake. Advertising remains an extremely inefficient and wasteful way for sellers to find buyers. I'm not saying advertising isn't effective, by the way; just that massive inefficiency and waste have always been involved, and that this fact constitutes a problem we've long been waiting to solve, whether we know it or not.
…The holy grail for advertisers isn't advertising at all, because it's not about sellers hunting down buyers. In fact it's the reverse: buyers hunting for sellers.
On April 22, 2008, Jay Rosen responds to Searls' comments to highlight the idea that whether ad spending grows, shrinks, or stays the same:
Advertisers aren't in business to advertise; they do it to reach customers making a buying decision. If there were some other way of reaching that person, some other way for buyers and sellers to communicate, advertising would become more and more superfluous.

Example:
Despite the highest readership of any newspaper in the United States, the New York Times only generated $330 million in online advertising in 2007. Total operating costs for that same year totaled $2.928 billion.

Assumptions:
It is widely reported that total newspaper operating costs would be reduced by 35% if newspapers eliminated their print product. Using the NYT example again, costs could be reduced to $1.903 billion.
Online advertising in general is growing approximately 12% year over year.
The New York Times is following this trend.
NYT online advertising revenue is projected to be ~$350 million or $29.17 million per month.

Audience:
The NYTimes.com reaches an average 15.6 million people per month (quantcast) and newspaper websites in aggregate reached 69.8 million people (naa).
65.4% of NYTimes.com readers come from the USA.
NYTimes.com is reaching approx. 3.3% of the US population (15.6 million x65.4%) =10.2024 million/(305 million).

Revenue per person:
$29.17 million month / 15.6 million unique monthly visitors = $1.87 per unique per month.
Each unique reader is worth $22.40 annually in online advertising revenue (a far cry from the 1 subscriber = $1000 which is what it was before the arrival of the internet).

Problem:
The gap to break-even is still a whopping $1.553 billion.
If advertising rates stay the same, The New York Times needs to raise its unique audience 5.437 times in order to break even. Here is how it breaks down:
5.437 X 15.6 million uniques per month =
84.82 million uniques per month X $1.86 per unique =
$158.6 million per month X 12 months =
$1.903 billion annual online advertising revenues =Break Even NOT YET PROFITABLE
Questions for further examination or the "Stalin Problem" (reality):
Is it unrealistic for NYTimes.com to grow their national audience reach much more than 3.3% considering their print audience reach is ~1million or roughly .3%?
Generating 84.82 million uniques per month would make NYTimes.com the number 5 website in the entire world, ahead of Wikipedia.org
Preliminary conclusions:
Assuming the Krugman Paradox is real:

Analysis of the Krugman Paradox suggests that pursuing online audience growth strategies to grow revenue may not be the best way to grow revenue
Analysis of the Krugman Paradox suggests that absent online advertising innovations, newspapers must seek alternative revenue streams to achieve economic sustainability.
Notes about my data:
NYTimes internet revenue figures include NYTimes.com, about.com, Boston.com and other company websites. I'm not too concerned though, because parsing out this data would only make their revenue numbers WORSE.
"Correlation does not imply causation", further investigation needs to be done to find out if the Krugman Paradox is real.
Of course, further research needs to be done in order to see if this situation is representative of the industry as a whole.

Source: Seekingalpha.com